Reading Differences from Children’s Picture Books: Constructing and De-constructing Images and Texts

Essay example from

Reading Differences from Children’s Picture Books:

Constructing and De-constructing Images and Texts

Yuna Nam

Before reading My Five Senses again, I will read Emmanuel Lévinas’ Totality and Infinity in order to see how Lévinas’ had claimed ‘touch’ and ‘vision’ in his text.

Inasmuch as the movement of the hand that touches traverses the “nothing” of space, touch resembles vision. Nevertheless vision has over the touch the privilege of maintaining the object in this void and receiving it always from this nothingness as from an origin, whereas in touch nothingness is manifested to the free movement of palpation. Thus for vision and for touch a being comes as though from nothingness, and in this precisely resides their traditional philosophical prestige.^[1]

It is not ‘the hand’ which ‘touches’; it is ‘the movement of the hand that touches’. ‘[T]he “nothing”’ is ‘the’ one; ‘the “nothing”’ is not nothing for the perspective on the statement above. Furthermore, there is ‘space’ where ‘the “nothing”’ is claimed to be its part. ‘[T]he movement of the hand’ does not ‘traverse’ ‘the “nothing”’; it is ‘the “nothing” of space’ where ‘the movement of the hand’ ‘touches’ and ‘traverses’. ‘[T]ravers[ing]’ ‘the movement of the hand’ does not necessarily contain touching, but there is ‘touch[ing]’ in the case of ‘travers[ing]’. ‘[T]he “nothing” of space’ has been ‘traverse[d]’ and also ‘touche[d]’ by ‘the movement of the hand’. A claim, ‘touch resembles vision’, is what has been stated later than ‘the movement of the hand that touches traverses the “nothing” of space”. ‘[T]ouch resembles vision’, but ‘vision’ might not resemble ‘touch’. ‘[T]ouch’ is not as same as ‘vision’.

        ‘[V]ision’ does not have ‘the privilege’ ‘over the touch’ for all the cases because ‘the privilege’ of ‘vision’ is refined to ‘maintaining the object in this void’ and ‘receiving it always from this nothingness as from as origin’. In other words, ‘touch[ing]’ would not be always under (my emphasis) ‘the privilege’ of ‘vision’. There is repetition of ‘this’ in the statement above: ‘this void’ and ‘this nothingness’. For the reason that ‘void’ and ‘nothingness’ are claimed with ‘this’, I would like to claim that ‘this void’ is not void and ‘this nothingness’ is not nothing. ‘[T]he object’ is not only ‘in this void’ but also has been ‘maintain[ed] [...] in this void’ with ‘the touch[ing]’ ‘the privilege’. There, ‘in this void’, ‘the object’ has not been seen and touched. When ‘it’ is claimed to be ‘receiv[ed]’, ‘it’ is not in anywhere. Something would be ‘from’ ‘an origin’ without an exception. ‘[I]t’ is not from ‘an origin’ when ‘it’ is ‘receiv[ed]’. ‘[I]t’ is ‘from this nothingness’. There might be something ‘from’ ‘this nothingness’. It seems that being ‘nothing[ness]’ can be mean something for some cases.

        In addition, ‘in touch nothingness is manifested to the free movement of palpation’. In this case, vision is not ‘in’ anywhere; vision is not claimed with ‘touch’ and ‘touch[ing]’ of ‘nothingness’. Without stating vision, ‘touch nothingness’ is ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’. However, to be ‘manifested’ does not mean that ‘touch nothingness’ is visible or detectable as ‘touch’ itself. Not all ‘touch[es]’ would be ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’. ‘[T]he free movement of palpation’ is not out of ‘manifestat[ion]’. With‘in’ the boundary of ‘the free movement of palpation’, ‘touch[ing] nothingness’ is claimed to be ‘in’ there. ‘[T]he free movement of palpation’ does not include vision. In other words, vision would not be ‘manifested to the free movement of palpation’.

        Something would be ‘from nothingness’,^[2] but it is not the cases for ‘vision’ and ‘touch’. ‘[A] being’ is also not ‘from nothingness’. ‘[V]ision’, ‘touch’ and ‘being’ are the latter and they are already ‘in this’ ‘their traditional philosophical prestige’. ‘[T]heir traditional philosophical prestige’ might not be out of ‘this’. ‘In’ there, ‘their traditional philosophical prestige’ ‘resides’. What is claimed to be ‘reside[d]’ ‘in’ there is neither tradition nor philosophy. ‘[P]restige’, which is not mine, belongs to multiple people. However, ‘prestige’ is also not the prestige of the perspective on the statement above. ‘[T]he[y]’ who own ‘traditional philosophical prestige’ is exclusive some other than ‘the[y]’ in that sense.

In relation to Berger and Lévinas’ texts and the pages which I have been reading from My Five Senses, I will read Yukuan Chen’s ‘Seeing Vision: Gesture, Movement and Colour in Painting in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Staring: How We Look’. There, Chen reads Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s ‘Staring: How We Look’.^[3] According to Chen, ‘this issue specifically by reading Garland-Thomson’s reading/description of a painting: the 1938 painting Blind Beggars by American artist Jacob Lawrence, and her framing of her reading/description of this painting in her book.’^[4] For the perspective on the statement, ‘reading’ is not ‘description’ and vice versa. It is not ‘Jacob Lawrence’ who claims that there is ‘a painting’. Something has been ‘read’. As a result of ‘reading’, ’a painting’ is claimed to be from ‘American artist Jacob Lawrence’ and ‘reading/description’ is claimed to be from ’Garland-Thomson’. In the case of ‘the 1938 painting Bind Beggars’, there is a singular ‘issue’ which is ‘specifically by reading Garland-Thomson’s reading/description of a painting’. ‘Bind Beggars’ is from ‘American artist Jacob Lawrence’ and it is read as ‘a painting’ in a ‘book’ of ‘Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’ according to the text from Chen.